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ABSTRACT:
The classic opposition of legal positivism and natural law theory resurfaces continually
and reminds us that we have yet to resolve this key conflict in our ways of understanding
the moral authority of law. The strengths and weaknesses of the two theories are
reviewed—both have fatal flaws. Conventionalism is proposed as a means of finding
internal standards in a man-made system of law. The naturally emerging standards for a
conventionalist system of law turn out to be the already familiar principles of the rule of
law.
KEY WORDS:
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founding, convention, conventionalism, principles of rule of law, morality and law

I.

The separation of law and morals is a thesis of positivist legal theory which is still highly
controversial and which has attracted considerable attention here on campus this
semester.
A.

The utilitarians first developed the thesis that it was important to distinguish
between law as it is and law as it ought to be.
1.

2.

Austin put it this way:
a.

"The existence of law is one thing; its merit or demerit is another.

b.

"Whether it be or be not is one enquiry; whether it be or be not
conformable to an assumed standard, is a different enquiry."

Their thesis was aimed against holders of the natural law view.
a.

Blackstone particularly came in for criticism for saying in his
Commentaries "that the laws of God are superior in obligation to
all other laws; that no human laws should be suffered to contradict
them; that human laws are of no validity if contrary to them, and
that all valid laws derive their force from that Divine original."
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b.

B.

C.

D.

The utilitarians were anxious to point out that human laws come
into existence as acts of human will, that they are often wrong,
foolish or mistaken in some important sense, and that they often
are unjust or morally dubious. They could not see how it helped
legal analysis to say they are not really laws, when all the world
knows they are and that only a fool would think the normal
sanctions of law will not be brought against those who ignore
them.

These utilitarian (or positivist) legal theorists recognized vast areas of overlap (or
interaction) between law and morals.
1.

They acknowledged that the law as it is is very much influenced by the
moral habits and beliefs of the people who have made the laws.

2.

They also acknowledged that moral principles could actually be
incorporated into statutes or constitutional limitations on rulers, and that
this was often the case--and often desirable.

What they resisted was the natural law thesis that law and morality were coextensive. Their counter thesis consisted of two limited claims:
1.

In the absence of an expressed constitutional or legal provision, it could
not follow from the mere fact that a rule violated standards of morality that
it was not a rule of law; and

2.

Conversely, it could not follow from the mere fact that a rule was morally
desirable that it was a rule of law.

Two BYU Forum speakers have made an issue of this thesis in their presentations
this fall, but with opposite intent.
1.

Daniel Bell, the Harvard sociologist, praised the principle of separation of
law and morals which he finds present in the documents and intentions of
the American Founding.
a.

Bell noted how such a principle is necessary to make freedom
possible in a pluralistic society, where people have some
differences of belief in moral and religious matters. To give
morality the force of law would be to give someone's particular
morality legal authoritative force over the different moral beliefs of
other minority groups.
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2.

3.

II.

(1)

Bell went on to conclude this principle prevents our laws
from taking any stands on moral issues where we might
disagree.

(2)

In particular, he pointed out that the principle prevented any
legal regulation of abortion, pornography, homosexual
relationships, and other activities which are morally
controversial.

On the other hand, Allston Chase blamed legal positivism and its thesis
separating law and morals for much of the cultural disaster of our times,
and for our inability as a people to develop a coherent moral point of view
that would guide our legislatures and judges.
a.

Chase argued that the American Founders never intended to
distinguish law and morality.

b.

He believes the Founders saw only continuity between law and
morals, and that such a separation would have appeared artificial to
them.

I want to argue that each of these views is mistaken in fundamental ways,
primarily because they each oversimplified the underlying philosophical
problem.
a.

Chase is wrong not to see in the American Founders an acceptance
of David Hume's version of the separation of law and morals.

b.

And Bell was wrong to conclude that the Founder's version of that
thesis committed them to the rather extreme interpretation of 20th
century libertarians, who can discover no rationale for restricting
abortion, drug abuse, pornography or homosexual activities.

The separation thesis makes several important contributions to our understanding of law,
which natural lawyers overlook.
A.

The statutes and common law rules that are legally binding on us are human
creations. Law is in some significant sense a function of human will.
1.

Even casual observation of the legislative and judicial processes will
disabuse us of the notion that our legislators can effectively divine either
the will of God or moral truth.
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2.

B.

C.

III.

a.

In a free society, law making is very much a matter of forging
workable compromises on rules of conduct and action.

b.

And the people engaged in doing this are quite obviously fallible,
often making serious mistakes in the pursuit of their own chosen
objectives. The rules they make often have consequences quite
different to those intended by their authors.

New regimes representing new coalitions of interests can change the rules.
This is what elections are all about.

Moral and religious complaints about legal rules are reasons to try to change the
rules.
1.

But those who enforce laws have no authority to make these changes as
part of the enforcement process.

2.

Such changes are reserved to the legislative process.

The separation thesis respects moral and religious pluralism.
1.

It provides a foundation for religious toleration.

2.

It undermines the rationale of those who would like to nationalize
morality, declaring one true moral view which will be obligatory on all,
whether they believe it or not.

The problem with the separation thesis as it stands is that it finds no standards or limits
internal to law which will prevent or restrict iniquity and exploitation.
A.

The standard example thrown up to positivists is the Nazi regime and its inhuman
statutes, which meet the requirements of legality on the separation thesis, but
which natural lawyers could easily dismiss as invalid or as non binding laws.

B.

As Alston Chase and countless other critics point out, the positivists seem to take
the view that morality does not count for anything in questions of law.

C.

Positivists have not found successful ways of deflecting this criticism, except to
stick doggedly to their insights about the origins of law in human will, a point that
does not go away easily.

D.

Recent natural law theorists such as John Finnis have shown that most of the
differences between positivist and natural law theory can be reconciled, but the
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issue over the separation of law and morals continues.

IV.

1.

Finnis renews in an impressive way the arguments derived from Aquinas
and Aristotle which claim to demonstrate that the operation of a legal
system assumes our ability to make objective value judgments, thus
assuming a fundamental union of law and morals.

2.

Positivists are not persuaded and sense some unbridgeable gap between
their unshakable conviction that law is created by fallible men and the
attempt to link it directly to some objectively true set of moral principles.

Any solution to this fundamental problem in legal theory will have to derive any internal
standards of good law from law as social fact, and not from any external value system.
A.

The key to a solution may lie in the characterization of law as convention.
1.

2.

B.

Recent theoretical work on convention by economists, game theorists, and
linguistic philosophers has characterized conventions as rules of conduct
agreed to by participants in situations where they can improve their
respective situations through coordination rather than competition.
a.

Coordination problems are positive sum games where participants
can win only if others gain as well.

b.

Solutions to long term or continuing coordination problems take
the form of rules which do not require constant renegotiation, but
which lay down legitimate expectations of conduct throughout a
community.

c.

The institution of law itself can then be seen as a community-wide
solution to a host of coordination problems, spelling out in advance
procedures and authorities for resolving future differences that
might arise between participants.

Such a beginning point is attractive because it can be attached by
extension to traditional positivist accounts, including Hobbes, Hume, and
Hart, without violence to their theories. And it also uses some of the
analysis of John Finnis, who is attracted to the idea of coordination as
definitive of the common good, the basis of the moral content of law.

The reason for extending positivist theory in this way is that it opens up a new
possibility for deriving internal standards from law as social fact.
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1.

2.

C.

The theoretical and empirical work on convention as coordination has
identified a still loose set of conditions of convention making.
a.

Conventions presume unanimity among the participants. Without
agreement there is no convention. Rules not based in agreement
presuppose coercion and are by definition not conventional.

b.

The conditions of conventionality are illuminating, though not
really surprising:
(1)

Conventions imply expectations of mutual advantage,
though the gains to different parties might vary both in
nature and in value. People do not voluntarily agree to
rules that reduce their welfare overall.

(2)

Conventions imply acceptable consistency with the various
moral beliefs of the participants. People do not willingly
join in forming rules that offend their moral views.

(3)

Conventions tend to form around salient potential solutions.
Lacking some salient solution to a coordination problem,
rough equality of outcome becomes a standard.

(4)

New conventions tend not to disrupt existing networks of
conventions. Changing existing rules under a system
requiring unanimous agreement is very costly.

But legal systems are quite obviously not driven by the principle of
unanimity. So how can they be thought of as conventional in the sense
developed here?
a.

Positivists in the last century were solidly tied to the command
theory of law, following Hobbes.

b.

To this day, positivists see no internal standard in law that
distinguishes successfully between tyrannical and free societies.
Both rely on coercive rules backed by sanctions.

What has not been noticed by these theorists is that reasonable human beings
might indeed agree to a system of rules that substituted institutional authority for
actual unanimity under conditions which preserve the characteristics of simple
conventions based in unanimous agreement.
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1.

Many theorists, including Hobbes, Hume, and more recently Buchanan,
have pointed out the tremendous advantages we all enjoy from having a
legal system, advantages which in advance might reasonably be calculated
to outweigh many inconveniences and risks.

2.

A fundamental convention to accept the authority of a system of law and
officials who could interpret, change, and enforce the law would be
reasonable if it could preserve certain basic conditions of unanimity. We
might say then that we have "constructive unanimity" in a legal system
which meets the following criteria:
a.

Rules in the system would need to be general, not singling out any
antecedently identifiable individuals or groups for injury or for
benefits at the cost of others.

b.

Rules in the system could only have prospective effect, and not
retrospective without compensation to injured parties or actual
unanimous consent.

c.

Rules of the system cannot implement group goals, but can only
function to enhance the efforts of individual members to pursue
their individually chosen goals. Of course, this includes the
possibility of groups of any size pursuing shared goals in voluntary
association with other like minded individuals and within the rules
of the system.

d.

Rules of the system must be clear, unambiguous and public.
Conformity to rules must always be possible and reasonable.

e.

Rules of the system must not directly jeopardize or conflict with
strongly held moral or religious views of community members.

f.

Rules must be plausibly beneficial to the community members as a
whole and potentially beneficial to all.

g.

The rules must be stable and consistent over time.

h.

There must be conventional procedures for amending the rules
which are effectively open to initiatives from all community
members.

i.

The system must provide means of resolving disputes about the
rules which operate in a neutral way between the parties.
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D.

V.

But these conditions of "constructive unanimity" are basically identical with the
traditional principles of rule of law.

The principles of rule of law emerge from this analysis as strong standards internal to the
law as fact, and as a solution to the separation of law and morals.
A.

Sociologists recognize convention-making, in the sense described above, as one of
the most universal and characteristic of human activities.

B.

Convention-making, when described empirically, yields a set of conditions.

C.

These conditions can reasonably be extended to a mature legal system when they
are built into the structure of authority and rules in that system protecting its
conventional character. A legal system built on these conditions can be said to
exhibit "constructive unanimity," and therefore can fairly be said to be
conventional.

D.

Identified as the principles of rule of law when they occur in a legal system, these
conditions lay down strong criteria for determining good and bad law as law,
though not with respect to any given system of moral or religious beliefs. These
provide their own criteria.

E.

This strong account of the rule of law overcomes the separation of law and morals
in traditional legal theory, and in a way that can be accepted by both natural
lawyers and positivists.

F.

1.

It provides clear grounds for evaluative distinction between the laws of a
truly conventional system and tyrannical regimes such as the Third Reich,
which used "law" as an instrument to pursue its infamous policies.

2.

It does so by invoking two concepts accepted by positivists, the foundation
of law in human choice and action, and the idea of rule of law as
descriptive of legal systems. But it links these two in a way that gives
much more force and central importance to the idea of rule of law, without
appealing to ideological theories in the way natural lawyers and some
liberal theorists have done to get the same effect.

This account shows both Bell and Chase to be mistaken:
1.

Chase could only see moral standards in law coming from systems of
religion and ethical belief. Like other natural lawyers, he was prepared to
nationalize morality to overcome the positivist inclination to separate law
and moralities.
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2.

Bell appreciated the implications of modern pluralism and the need to
respect differing moral and religious points of view in law. But he
wrongly concluded that the law could therefore have no inherent standards
that would protect us from tyranny or that would allow legislation relative
to moral questions.
a.

Rule of law prevents laws that disadvantage minorities because of
their moral beliefs.]

b.

But there is nothing in rule of law that prevents a community from
regulating activities that it deems to be profoundly immoral and
dangerous for the welfare of the community as such.

c.

Rule of law does greatly restrict the means by which such
immorality can be regulated, requiring all kinds of openness and
fairness.

d.

Rule of law bridges the traditional gap separating law and morals.
But it does not do so by nationalizing morality.
(1)

(2)

Rather, under rule of law, the actual morals held by
members of the society come together to form a sieve
which functions negatively to prevent legal action that
violates the fundamental moral beliefs of minorities.
But even this is not a firm protection. And the institutions
of rule of law are the true protection minorities enjoy. But
there are not guarantees against injustice. A wicked people
can injure one another under rule of law.

